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SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PREDATORS AND
POST-PRISON COMMITMENT LAWS
Saul J. Faerstein, M.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The laws and standards we are discussing here today were writ-
ten by legislators and appellate judges, most of whom are attorneys.
Ultimately, however, it is mental health practitioners who have to
make commitment and treatment decisions under these laws. To do
so requires that they understand the laws and be able to provide the
treatment required by these laws. Attorneys may be concerned with
whether these laws are constitutional and whether they reflect valid
social policy. From the perspective of the psychiatrist, it is necessary
to consider whether these laws make sense medically and whether
their mandates can be carried out by mental health practitioners.
Baxstrom v. Herold created a requirement that post-prison
commitments meet specified civil commitment standards. These in-
clude the presence of a mental disorder and the finding of danger to
self, danger to others, and grave disability. 2 Barefoot v. Estelle estab-
lished that psychiatrists may predict with an acceptable degree of re-
liability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the fu-
ture and so represent a danger to the community.3 Foucha v.
Louisiana set a standard that there be a mental illness and the finding
of dangerousness in order to commit.4 The problem for mental
health professionals was defining "mental disorder" and defining the
criteria for "dangerousness."
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, UCLA School of Medicine;
Postdoctoral Fellow in Psychiatry and the Law, University of Southern California
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1. See 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966).
2. See id. at 114-15.
3. See 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
4. See 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
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II. KANSAS V. HENDRICKS'
Kansas law provides for civil commitment of persons who, due to
a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder," are "likely to en-
gage in the predatory acts of sexual violence."' Leroy Hendricks had
a long history of sexually molesting children. Diagnosed with pedo-
philia, he continued to harbor sexual desires for children and was
unable to "'control the urge' to molest children" when "stressed
out."8 At the commitment hearing, the jury determined that Hen-
dricks was a sexually violent predator.' The trial court found that pe-
dophilia was a "mental abnormality" under the statute and Hendricks
was committed to the state hospital."
On appeal, the Kansas State Supreme Court invalidated the
statute on the ground that a finding of a "mental abnormality" did
not satisfy the "substantive" due process requirement that involun-
tary civil commitment must be predicated on a "mental illness" find-
ing." The United States Supreme Court heard the case on appeal in
December 1996 and ruled in June 1997.12 They held that the Act's
definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies substantive due process
requirements.13 The Court ruled that "people who are unable to con-
trol their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public
health and safety" can be involuntarily committed, provided that the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and eviden-
tiary standards. 4 The Court, referring to previous holdings, held such
standards to be the presence of a "mental illness" and the presence of
"dangerousness."' The Kansas law required both a "mental abnor-
mality," or a "personality disorder,"-which the Supreme Court
found met the test of a "mental illness"-and a state of
"dangerousness."' 6 The Court left to the states the task of defining
terms of a medical nature that have legal significance. 7
5. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
6. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
7. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 527-28 (4th ed. 1994).
& Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
9. See id. at 2079.
10. See id
11. Id.
12. See id at 2072.
13. See id. at 2079.
14. See id. at 2080.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 2081.
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The Court found "that the Act does not establish criminal pro-
ceedings," and that involuntary commitment under it is not punish-F. • 19
ment.1 According to the Court, the intent of the Act is not punitive
because it lacks the two primary elements of criminal punishment:
retribution. and deterrance. The right to restrain dangerously men-
tally ill persons was historically regarded as a legitimate non-punitive
objective." The purpose of the Act was found to be rehabilitation or
treatment,23 and the indefinite confinement would end as soon as the
mental abnormality would no longer cause the offender to be a threat
to others.24 But what did the Court say about the obligation to pro-
vide treatment? It ruled that the Act is not necessarily punitive if it
fails to offer treatment where treatment for a condition is not possi-
ble, or if treatment, though possible, is merely an ancillary, rather
than an overriding, state concern. Thus, treatment need not be
provided at all and the Act would still conform to a legislative intent
that it be rehabilitation. Incredibly, this would mean that warehous-
ing equals rehabilitation.
What did the Court mean by stating that treatment for a condi-
tion might not "be possible?" Does this refer to monetary limita-
tions, personnel shortages, and institutional constraints? Or might
we infer that the Court considers that certain mental abnormalities
are not treatable? This issue, glossed over in the Hendricks opinion,
may well be the most difficult issue in the post-criminal commitment
debate.
III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITIONS
The Hendricks case spurred a debate as to whether a mental ab-
normality was a mental illness. Forensic psychiatrists have debated
for years about the terms mental illness, mental disease, and mental
defect. Is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)2 the arbiter
18. Id. at 2085.
19. See id.
20. See id at 2082. The Court found that the Act "does not affix culpability
for prior criminal conduct" nor does it "make a criminal conviction a prerequisite
for commitment." Id
21. See id According to the Court, persons with "a 'mental abnormality' or
'personality disorder'.., are... unlikely to be deterred by the threat of con-
finement." Id
22. See id. at 2083.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 2084.
26. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNosTIc AND STATISTICAL
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of whether a condition is a mental disease, disorder or defect? Why
is Antisocial Personality Disorder not considered a mental disorder
for the purpose of a not guilty by reason of insanity acquittal, but ac-
ceptable for the mental abnormality part of a post-criminal commit-
ment standard which leads to a loss of liberty?
Labeling a condition as a disease or disorder to some extent in-
volves a value judgment." Before DSM III,28 homosexuality was
considered a mental disorder. It was removed from the DSM in part
as a political act of American psychiatry. It is still unclear whether a
sexual attraction to children or other alteration of sexual object
choice is determined by biology or by early life experience. In either
case, once this drive is determined, it cannot be psychologically
21erased, even with the exercise of will power.
IV. PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS
How do you determine that a committed patient is no longer
dangerous? There is no objective standard to make that determina-
tion the way one can use specific criteria to make the diagnosis of a
mental illness. "Dangerousness" is not itself a mental disorder.
Rather, it is a social state that may be determined by the presence of
a mental disorder, as well as other social variables. When it comes
time to consider the release of an individual determined to be dan-
gerous, one's past history of violent or dangerous conduct will still be
part of the database, but there will also be a period of time in con-
finement with a totally different set of variables. While in confine-
ment, it is nearly impossible to measure dangerousness. The prison
or hospital setting is not an environment which replicates real society.
For example, there is the absence of potential sexual victims when
housed apart-women and children-there is the constant visible
presence of controls-guards or doctors-and there is an absence of
the pressures of life outside the walls-earning a living, paying bills-
which may increase frustration and decrease impulse controls.
How do you ever know when you have reached the point of
"nondangerousness" of the inmate or patient? The classic studies of
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
27. See Fred S. Berlin, Ethical Use of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 13 PSYCHIATRIC
ANNALS 321,321-31 (1983).
28. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1987).
29. See Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some Medical,
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 233,
233-39 (1989).
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John Monahan differentiated short-term predictions from long-term
predictions." These studies also defined the contexts and factors
which effect the reliability of such predictions.3' Applying Monahan's
criteria, is it really possible to determine that a sex offender is a dan-
ger to society at the end of a long period of incarceration, and then to
make a further prediction that the sex offender will be a danger for a
significant period in the future?
V. THE CALIFORNIA SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAW
The California Sexually Violent Predator Law,32 passed in 1995
and implemented on January 1, 1996, allowed for the civil commit-
ment of sexual offenders released by the California Department of
Corrections (CDC).33 The procedure requires both a consensus by
the examining doctors that the individual is still dangerous and the
safeguard of a jury trial, which must reach a unanimous verdict that
the individual is a "Severely Violent Predator."34 While you can lead
these offenders to treatment, you cannot make them undergo treat-
ment. Under the law, amenability to treatment is not required. The
offenders need not recognize their problems, they need not partici-
pate in the treatment program, and the treatment need not be suc-
cessful.35
In addition to requiring that the offender meet the legal criteria
of having committed certain specified offenses, the offender must
have a "diagnosed mental disorder., 36 The disorder is defined as a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or voli-
tional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of
criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to
the health and safety of others."37 This definition was modeled on a
Washington state statutewhich allowed inclusion of both Axis I and
Axis II disorders.3 ' Thus, almost any diagnosis in the DSM-IV,
30. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BE-
HAVIOR 14-15 (1981).
31. Id.
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 et seq. (West Supp. 1998).
33. See id. § 6600(a).
34. See People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
35. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(b).
36. Id § 6600(c).
37. Id.
38. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
39. Axis I and Axis II are classifications used to group disorders together.
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 25-27 (4th ed. 1994).
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except V Codes,4° could be used to qualify offenders for commitment.
VI. TREATMENT
In 1975 Alan Stone proposed a set of criteria for involuntary
hospitalization based on a need for treatment rather than on danger-
ousness.4' A more recent study concluded that (1) assessments of
treatability should be seen as more practically relevant to disposi-
tional decisions than assessments of criminal responsibility, and (2)
improving the effectiveness of treatment is a better approach to the
problem of dangerousness than attempting to improve predictive
methods.42
Whether the aberration in sexual offenders is a biological or a
psychological problem, the only way to alter the pattern of sexual
drive is through professional treatment. Without treatment, incar-
ceration, or even warehousing in a hospital setting, will not have an
impact. Are there treatments available for sexual offenders and are
there studies to show whether or not they are effective? Are organic
treatments more effective than psychological treatments?
Treatment might prove to be more effective in the
post-conviction stage, when guilt or innocence is not at issue. Sex of-
fenders were found to be more defensive and in greater denial in the
early treatment stages, especially when the legal consequences were
greater.4' Only in later treatment were they found to move from an
acknowledgement of minimal deviant behavior to an admission of re-
current behavior, and later, if at all, to provide a detailed description
about fantasies and urges.44
VII. ORGANIC TREATMENTS
Several pharmacological treatments have been researched and
used in the treatment of sex offenders. The first, Depo-Provera
(medroxyprogesterone)-a synthetic progesterone that decreases
plasma testosterone and consequently the sexual libido-has been
40. V Codes denote no mental illness. See id. at 4.
41. See ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRAN-
SITION (DREW Publication No. ADM 75-176, 1975).
42. See Vernon L. Quinsey, Assessments of the Treatability of Forensic Pa-
tients, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 443, 447-49 (1988).
43. See Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 597, 617 (1992).
44. See Sheldon Travin, M.D., Sex Offenders: Diagnostic Assessment, Treat-
ment, and Related Issues, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSY-
CHIATRY 531-32 (Richard Rosner ed. 1994).
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called "a sexual appetite suppressant."45 It is an injectable steroid
which has been tested and used for the past thirty years to treat
paraphilic disorders. It is given by weekly injection, which makes it
very easy to document its administration, and it can be monitored
with a simple blood test of testosterone levels. Moreover, it is not
expensive, which makes it available to public institutions. Lowering
the strength of the sexual drive will not change the sexual object
choice, but it will make it easier to control the behavioral response to
the drive. It will help free the mind of obsessional cravings and ru-
minations about unacceptable forms of sexual behavior.
Another biological treatment is the use of anti-obsessive medi-
cations. Since most sex offenders tend to act out in repetitive and
predictable patterns, their behavior resembles the behavior of obses-
sive-compulsive disorders. If one could reduce the frequency and in-
tensity of the obsessive sexual thoughts, then one might reduce the
sexual acting out which follows. In fact, it has been shown that Bus-
pirone, a serotonergic drug with anticonvulsive properties, has been
effective in treating sex offenders. Other medications may prove
equally as effective.
Other studies have found that a variety of phenothiazines, such
as Mellaril, and antidepressants including Prozac have been effective
with treating paraphilic disorders.
VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENTS
Psychological treatment of sexual disorders has been extensively
utilized for both inpatient and outpatient treatment. This approach
includes both behavioral and psychodynamic treatments. Although
both individual and group therapy are used, it is clear that the eco-
nomic limitations of individual treatment favor the latter therapy.
There is no evidence that any one school or methodology can effec-
tively change sexual object choice, even if that choice were psycho-
logically determined.
Cognitive and behavioral therapy has also been found to have
some effectiveness in the population of sex offenders. These tech-
niques have expanded since the 1970s to include programs to modify
deviant and appropriate arousal, provide sex education, enhance
self-esteem and social skills, reduce hostility and anger, control alco-
45. Berlin, supra note 29, at 235.
46. H. J. Pearson et al., Treatment of a Compulsive Paraphilic with Buspirone,
5 ANNALS OF SEx REs. 239, 239-46 (1992).
47. See Travin, supra note 44, at 531-32.
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hol abuse, and teach offenders to use their leisure time more con-
structively. The development and application of cognitive-behavioral
therapy programs by G.G. Abel were directed at the distortions of-
fenders have in their views of themselves, the behavior and feelings
of their victims, and the means by which such distortions might be
modified.4 Treatment is also directed at enhancing offenders' empa-
thy for their victims and improving intimacy skills.
Because there is a significant relapse rate even among treated
sex offenders, some of these approaches have been incorporated into
relapse prevention, a new treatment method which has had some suc-
cess in the addictions. This treatment involves recognizing high risk
situations and developing effective coping responses. The approach
developed at the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Aggressors
involves identifying and altering both internal self-management skills
49and external factors affecting behaviors. Most researchers agree
that "the treatment approach for any individual patient should ide-
ally involve varying combinations of these treatments."50
Psychological treatments are labor-intensive and require skilled,
trained, and competent therapists working long hours over long peri-
ods of time. The economic realities suggest that such resources are
only in limited availability in correctional institutions and state hospi-
tals.
IX. VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
Most therapists find that voluntary, motivated patients do better
than involuntary patients in achieving treatment aims. The popula-
tion we consider here today is the involuntary group. Is it not a myth
that treatment is voluntary when we limit the options available to
post-conviction patients?
What factors are likely to improve compliance among these pa-
tients in treatment? Are they likely to continue taking medications
which reduce feelings and behaviors that have been experienced with
pleasure? Patients with seizure disorders generally take anti-seizure
medications because the cessation of seizures is a positive experience.
But some bipolar patients stop taking lithium because they do not
want to lose manic episodes which may be experienced as exciting,
4& See Gene G. Abel et al., An Integrated Treatment Program for Rapists, in
CLINICAL AsPECrs OF THE RAPIST 161-214 (R.T. Rada ed. 1978).
49. See Lael Montgomery, Sex Offenders in the Community: Colorado's New
Standards and Guidelines-Part I, CoLo. LAW., Dec. 1996, at 47, 48.
50. Travin, supra note 44, at 531.
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productive, empowering, and enjoyable. Do sexual predators experi-
ence their deviant sexual behavior as enjoyable and exciting? If so,
they are more likely to avoid taking medications voluntarily or com-
plying with treatment.
X. FACTORS COMPLICATING TREATMENT
The problem of substance abuse further complicates the return
of sex offenders to society. One study showed that 50% of offenders
were intoxicated at the time of their most recent offense, and that
51there were drug and alcohol abuse problems in 60% of these men.
Clearly, there is a greater opportunity to abuse drugs and alcohol
following release into the community than during the period of inpa-
tient treatment when dangerousness is being assessed.
While only a relatively small percentage of sex offenders are
psychopathic, 7.5% of child molesters and 12.2% of rapists according
to one study,2 the role of personality disorder may further complicate
the efforts to treat offenders and alter long standing patterns of
thinking and behavior. V.L. Quinsey and his associates found that
Hare's Revised Psychopathy checklist had merit as a predictor of re-
cidivism among sex offenders. 3
Some studies suggest that sex offenders may have multiple
paraphilias s4 If sex offenders are polymorphously perverse, this would
demand a different approach to assessment and treatment than is cur-
rently employed, complicating and lengthening treatment, and making
it even more difficult to determine the point at which they would no
longer be considered dangerous as a result of psychopathology.
Studies of hospitalized sex offenders have found that there are
significant deficits in social skills among rapists
5 and child molesters 6
51. See W.L. Marshall, Assessment, Treatment and Theorizing about Sex Of-
fenders: Developments During the Past Twenty Years and Future Directions, 23
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 162, 176 (1996) (citing M.M. CHRISTIE ET AL., A
DEscRIFrIvE STUDY OF INCARCERATED RAPISTS AND PEDOPHILES (1979)).
52. See iL (citing R.C. Serin et al., Psychopathy and Deviant Sexual Arousal
in Incarcerated Sexual Offenders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 3-11 (1994)).
53. See id. (citing Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Psychopathy, sexual deviance and
recidivism among sex offenders released from a maximum security institution, in
PENETANGUISHENE RESEARCH REPORT 7(1) (1990)).
54. See Gene G. Abel and Joanne L. Rouleau, The Nature and Extent of Sex-
ual Assault, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES AND
TREATMENT OF THE OMFENDER 9-21 (Marshall et al. eds., 1990).
55. See David N. Lipton et al., Heterosocial Perceptions in Rapists, 55 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 17,17-21 (1987).
56. See Zindel V. Segal & William L. Marshall, Discrepancies Between Self-
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which could be directly related to inappropriate social behavior and
sexually offending conduct. Rapists misconstrued women's cues in
social situations. Child molesters construed children as non-
dominant and easy to relate to, while viewing adults as overbearing
and threatening.57 Some studies have found higher levels of hostility
toward women among rapists, exhibitionists, and non-familial child
molesters compared to non-offender controls.58
How do you address these issues and change life-long patterns in
individuals who are less than well-motivated to change? Many sex
offenders have grown up under circumstances that have eroded their
self-esteem, confidence and trust in others. Those who emerge from
prison and face treatment in hospitals or outpatient settings, the
population we consider here today, have been typically treated with
contempt and further abuse while incarcerated, raising the threshold
for engagement in therapy. These offenders are found to have high
levels of denial and minimization, and limited psychological insight.
They are found to be deficient in empathy toward their victims.59
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The decision to use psychiatric hospitalization to extend the in-
carceration of sex offenders by post-conviction commitment for the
protection of society is grounded in a belief that psychiatrists can
predict future danger. Although courts have granted psychiatrists
this power, psychiatrists continue to debate whether they have the
ability to make such predictions accurately and effectively.
The decision to move sex offenders from prison settings to hos-
pital settings at the end of their prison terms has been driven by the
social policy that sex offenders should be removed from society for as
long as they pose a danger. Placing them in hospitals can be morally
justified only if the hospitals can provide treatment. Otherwise, hos-
pitals are no more than prisons by another name.
There are many problems in treating sex offenders and many
questions about the most productive treatment approaches. Current
research indicates that progress is being made in identifying effective
efficacy Predictions and Acutal Performance in a Population of Rapists and Child
Molesters, 10 COGNrTrvE THERAPY RES. 363, 363-76 (1986).
57. See Kevin Howells, Some Meanings of Children for Pedophiles, in LOVE
AND ATTRACrION 524-25 (Mark Cook & Glenn Wilson eds., 1978).
58. See Bonnie T. Seidman et al., An Examination of Intimacy and Lonliness
in Sex Offenders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 518, 524-26 (1994).
59. See Marshall, supra note 51, at 182-84.
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treatments for sex offenders.6 The choices society makes in imple-
menting such treatments may be decided by the limited resources
available, but ultimately it should be outcome studies that determine
treatment choices.
60. See id at 187-90.
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